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Abstract

This study examines the impact of the heuristic representation on IPO anomaly in the context of
an emerging market from January 2006 to December 2016. Models consist of multiple regression
has been evaluated. Our results show: firstly, the distribution of initial return, oversubscription
ratio, firm age, offer period, firm size, heuristic representation, and flipping activity are positively
skewed; Secondly, the oversubscription ratio has a positive relationship with flipping activity. This
is because higher demand makes investors flip more to liquidate the IPO on the first trading day.
In contrast, firm size has a negative relationship with flipping activity. A larger IPO firm is more
stable in terms of performance, and less risky in terms of business operation; Thirdly, heuristic
representation influences the relationship between oversubscription ratio and flipping activity;
Lastly, this study dispels the notion that investors are active in subsequent trading but not
necessarily obtain a profit from the liquidation. This study extends earlier work by examining the
interaction effect of heuristic representation to the flipping activity in an emerging market.
JEL classification: E22, G01, G11, G24
Keywords: Heuristic representation, IPO anomaly, Initial return, Oversubscription ratio, Firm
size, Flipping activity.
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Introduction
The IPO research in aftermarket trading has obtained considerable attention in recent years,
especially in the U.S. These studies mainly focused on the aspect of price stabilization by IPO
underwriter. The process of price stabilization is called flipping activity where the disposal of share
by the IPO subscriber on the first trading day. In Australia, this is known as “stagging” activity,
but this issue only has limited attention in Malaysia.
According to Hanley et al. (1993), Aggarwal (2000), Ellis et al. (2000), Aggarwal et al. (2002) and
Fishe (2002), IPO underwriter plays an essential role in the flipping activity. They serve as the
market maker who stabilize the downward pressure of share price from flipping activity by the
IPO subscriber. Therefore, the net buying from the underwriter in the aftermarket trading could
stabilize the IPO price, especially during the weak IPO offering (Carter and Dark, 1993).
In the weak IPO offering, the flipping cost is expensive for underwriters, and this is known as IPO
inventory risk. When the inventory risk becomes higher, investors will have less interest to buy
the share in the secondary market, and hence lesser IPO subscription. According to Correra (1992),
underwriters always at “war against IPO flippers” to reduce IPO inventory risk. They deter flipping
activity from those flippers who dispose of the shares in a short period.
Besides, Hanley et al. (1996) highlight that flipping activity creates problem to the IPO syndicate.
For instance, co-managers involve in IPO distribution and aftermarket trading. They acquire 8.7%
of the shares offered on the first trading day. Meanwhile, the underwriter is 58.8% (Ellis et al.,
2000). This helps co-managers to allocate the shares more effectively and leads to price
stabilization, especially during weak IPO offering. For flippers, they reduce the searching cost and
encourages more long-term investors (Hanley et al., 1996).
In this paper, there are two considerations in flipping activity: First, the underwriter discourages
an investor from selling share from the subscription on the first trading day. If there is a higher
liquidation, the flipping activity will cause the poor IPO performance; Second, if the flipping
activity is inactive, there will be no aftermarket trading, and the demand of subsequent trading will
be reduced, causing lesser price movement.
The motivation of this study is from two critical arguments. First, the flipping activity in Malaysian
IPO is different as compared to the U.S. market. For instance, the U.S. underwriters involve more
frequently in price stabilization in aftermarket trading. In contrast, flipping activity in Malaysia is
common, but this is supported by the high initial return and demand in the secondary market.
According to Wong (2005), though IPO price support is illegal, the underwriter and IPO syndicate
still involve in aftermarket trading.
Second, the Malaysian IPO is unique in terms of allocation, which is a private placement offering.
For instance, the underwriter identifies a group of institutional investors such as banks, mutual
funds, insurance companies, pension funds, and gives the priority for them to subscribe to newly
issued share. This is known as a non-public offering which helps to support the downward pressure
of share price.
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According to Shiller (2003), the representative heuristic is defined as a “tendency for people to
categorize events as typical or representative of a well-known class”. The representative heuristic
asserts that individuals assess the likelihood of an event to occur by similar outcomes of its
stereotypes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). Hence, it is convenient for investors to reply to this
type of heuristic for judgment and prediction.
This study will examine whether heuristic representation serves as an interaction role in affecting
the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. In our study, flipping activity
as measured by trading volume is used to determine the impact of an initial return, oversubscription
ratio, firm age, offer period, firm size and heuristic representation. This study contributes to the
extant literature on IPO flipping activity with heuristic representation in the context of IPO in an
emerging market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the past literature,
followed by data and methodology. Section four discusses the results. The last session concludes
the study.
Literature Review
Numerous research in aftermarket trading (a proxy for flipping) have been conducted to explain
the flipping behaviour together with IPO initial return. In the early studies by Miller and Reilly
(1987), Schultz and Zaman (1994), they show a positive relationship between initial return and
flipping activity. The results are consistent with Ellis et al. (2000) and Aggarwal (2003) who
confirm the positive relationship between initial return and flipping activity.
Boehmer and Fishe (2000) argue that IPOs are costly to obtain greater liquidity in aftermarket
trading. They explain that the underwriter sets a lower offer price intentionally to receive better
demand and initial return. This induces the flipping from low valuation investors to high valuation
investors that lead to high post-listing liquidity and initial return of the IPO. In most of the IPO
markets, the underwriter does not have the authority to interfere in aftermarket trading. However,
with a significant initial return, it affects the selling decision of investors and leads to lower
flipping activity.
There are many studies done in the U.S. market on IPO flipping activity (Krigman et al., 1999;
Bash, 2001; Aggarwal, 2003; Gounopoulos, 2006). Krigman et al. (1999) and Bash (2001) study
the relationship between pricing error and flipping activity of the long-term IPO performance.
Their results show that flipping activity is not the main factor that causes poor aftermarket
performance. However, flipping is negatively explained by initial return and market capitalization.
The flipping activity is not limited to retail investors but also available for institutional investors.
According to Benveniste and Spindt (1989), there is a negative relationship between initial return
and institutional flipping. The result is similar to Krigman et al. (1999) and Bash (2001), both
findings show that flipping activity is more significant during the negative initial return, especially
during the weak IPO offering.
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Besides, Aggarwal (2003) uses 617 IPOs sample from May to June 1998; the results show that
institutional investors flip more than retail investors in hot IPO. In contrast, Gounopoulos (2006)
shows that institutional investors flip more than retail investors in cold IPO and when a larger size
is issued. These findings conclude that institutional investors are also aggressive in IPO flipping
activity, indicating a response to the IPO performance.
In Malaysia context, studies from Chong et al. (2009) and Chong (2009) find the flipping activity
in the aspect of behaviour finance from 1991 to 2003 with a total sample of 132 IPOs. Their results
show that the noise effect and disposition effect has a positive relationship with flipping activity,
and there is a negative relationship between issue size and flipping activity. Their results are
consistent with Islam & Munira (2004).
The studies from Sapian et al. (2012) and Abdul-Rahim et al. (2013) find the flipping activity is
significantly related to initial return, institutional investors, and offer size. Their results conclude
that higher initial return and higher institutional participation bring higher flipping activity;
Meanwhile, larger issue size brings lower flipping activity.
Besides, Chong et al. (2011) show that there is a negative relationship between heuristic
representation and flipping activity. The result is consistent with Shefrin and Statman (1993) and
Shiller (2003). They show that heuristic representation influences the decision making from an
investor from the perspective of behavioral finance.
In the stock market, heuristic representation is a judgment bias that can help an investor to estimate
a stock is either winner or loser, and the market is either bull or bear which according to past
events. The study from Tversky and Kahneman (1983) shows the intuitive prediction based on the
similarity of the evidence and possible outcome that cause the judgement bias for an investment.
Shefrin and Statman (1993) also indicate the heuristic representation lead an investor to be more
optimistic due to experiences on the past gains and pessimistic due to experiences on the past
losses. Heuristic representation helps to make a quick decision, but it can be risky for investment
because not all information is carefully considered, and resulted with the fallacy. Bayley et al.
(2006) show a positive relationship between heuristic representation and the investor’s decision to
flip from both Australian institutional investor and individual investor.
Besides, according to Che-Yahya et al. (2014), they study the sentiment of shareholders through
the impact of the lock-up period to the flipping activity. This study focuses on the different length
of time affects the different sentiments of the major shareholders to hold on to the IPO. They found
a negative relationship between lock-up period and flipping activity. This is because a more
extended lock-up period causes significant shareholders to hold the shares for good IPO.
Our study is different from Che-Yahya et al. (2014). First, judgment bias exists when an investor
or shareholder is allowed to liquidate the IPO on the first trading day. Second, the sentiment of the
investor or shareholder may change because they are more concerned about the share performance
rather than business performance.
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Besides, Leow and Lau (2018a) study the investor's sentiment on the first day of trading during
the Global Financial Crisis. The results show that investors still able to gain about 1 to 3 per cent
of returns during the crisis period among the new issues on the first day of trading, even the
investor’s sentiment is low. The market sentiment for IPO was at its worst period during the Global
Financial Crisis, and the investors did not want to hold on to the IPO. According to Leow and Lau
(2018b), a more detailed study on the high-low intraday performance of IPO during the Global
Financial Crisis. The result indicates a total return of -5 to 11 per cent during the crisis period. It
can be concluded that there is still a positive return as an investor's sentiment is low during the
crisis period.
Therefore, this study examines the relationship between variables such as initial return,
oversubscription ratio, firm age, offer period, firm size and heuristic representation. Moreover, this
study is different from previous literature by focusing on the interaction effect of heuristic
representation which is the judgment bias when an investor is allowed to liquidate the IPO on the
first trading day.
Data and Methodology
This paper uses 186 IPOs which are listed on Bursa Malaysia from January 1, 2006, to December
31, 2016. The IPO information such as offer price, closing price, offer period and unit offer can be
obtained from Bursa Malaysia website; Firm age can be obtained from the annual report; Oversubscription ratio and trading volume can be found from the newspaper on the next day of IPO
debut.
In order to have a comprehensive understanding of the impact of heuristic representation on the
flipping activity, this paper examines the interaction effect of the heuristic representation on the
relationship between an independent variable and dependent variable. The conceptual framework
and relevant hypotheses are shown in Figure 1.
In equation (1), the dependent variable is IPO flipping activity as measured by the liquidity, FAi =
(volume/unit offer) x100. Besides, the independent variables consist of IPO initial return,
oversubscription ratio, firm age, offer period firm size and heuristic representation. In equation
(2), the interaction effect of heuristic representation is measured by the equally weighted initial
return of IPO, IRi = ∑[(Pt – Pt-1)/ Pt-1) + ………(Pt – Pt-n)/ Pt-n)] x (100). It is calculated as the
average on the percentage change in price from offer price to the closing price on the first day of
trading.

FAi  0  1IRi   2OSRi  3 LogAGEi   4 LogOPi  5 LogSizei  6 HRi   i .............(1)
FAi   0  1IRi   2OSRi  3 LogAgei   4 LogOPi  5 LogSizei   6 HRi   7 IRi * HRi
 8OSRi * HRi  9 LogAgei * HRi  10 LogOPi * HRi  11LogSizei * HRi   i ................(2)
Where:
FAi is flipping activity that denotes the percentage of trading volume divided by the number of
shares issued on the first day of trading of the ith company. (Aggarwal, 2003)
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IRi is the initial return that denotes the percentage change in price from the offer price to the closing
price on the first day of trading of the ith company. (Dawson, 1987)
OSRi is oversubscription ratio that denotes the number of times an IPO issue is either overdemanded or under-demanded by the group of investors of the ith company. (Yong, 1996)
LogAGEi is the firm age that denotes the number of years since establishment to its listing of the
ith company. A log transformation is applied because of its positive skewness. (Carter and
Manaster, 1990; Ritter, 1984)
LogOPi is offer period that denotes the duration of the subscription of the ith company. A log
transformation is applied because of its positive skewness. (Guo and Brooks, 2009)
LogSizei is the firm size that denotes the number of the unit offers multiply by the offer price of
the ith company. A log transformation is applied because of its positive skewness. (Wasserman,
2003)
HRi is heuristic representation denotes the equally weighted initial return for the three most recent
new issues listed before the IPO listing. (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Shiller, 2003; Bayley et
al., 2006)
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework

Source: Authors' sketch
Figure 1 shows the conceptual framework of the hypotheses developed based on the expected
relationship between the independent variable and dependent variable. This study uses the theory
of finance from IPO initial return and examines the following hypotheses:
H1: There is a positive relationship between initial return and flipping activity.
H2: There is a positive relationship between the oversubscription ratio and flipping activity.
H3: There is a negative relationship between firm age and flipping activity.
H4: There is a positive relationship between the offer period and flipping activity.
H5: There is a negative relationship between firm size and flipping activity.
H6: There is a positive relationship between heuristic representation and flipping activity.
8
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H7: There is an interaction effect of the initial return and heuristic representation to the flipping
activity.
H8: There is an interaction effect of the oversubscription ratio and heuristic representation to
the flipping activity.
H9: There is an interaction effect of the firm age and heuristic representation to the flipping
activity.
H10: There is an interaction effect of the offer period and heuristic representation to the flipping
activity.
H11: There is an interaction effect of the firm size and heuristic representation to the flipping
activity.
From the hypotheses, H1 to H6 are used to test in equation (1), we expect that initial return,
oversubscription ratio, offer period and heuristic representation should have the positive
relationship with flipping activity and firm age and firm size have the negative relationship with
flipping activity.
H7 to H11 is used to test in equation (2) to examine to what extent heuristic representation
influences the relationship between initial return, oversubscription ratio, firm age, offer period,
firm size and flipping activity. The judgement of investor is varied when subscribing to the IPO,
and this causes the demand will be increased or decreased. It is believed that the interaction with
the heuristic representation will have an impact on the flipping activity on the first day of trading.
Results
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent variables
n
Mean
Median
Std. Dev
Min.
Variables
Flipping Activity
186
19.21
12.59
22.43
0.00
186
16.35
6.52
49.08
-57.30
Initial Return
19.27
9.91
31.77
-12.97
Oversubscription Ratio 186
Age
186
14.94
11.50
14.37
0.50
186
10.63
9.00
3.78
5.00
Offer Period
Size (million)
186
1342.46
151.56
4699.21
19.56
16.41
9.92
29.17
-22.46
Heuristic Representation 186
Note: *,** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively.

Max.

Jarque-Bera

170.70
369.50
315.17
90.00
26.00
40400.00
124.85

1099.63***
4834.43***
13731.21***
16.39***
29.16***
53.97***
232.40***

Table 1 shows the mean and median of all variables of the 186 IPOs for the entire period from
2006 to 2016. As observed, all variables except age are skewed to the right, as the mean is higher
than the median. This is because some of the IPOs offer higher return when there is greater demand
than supply. Both initial return and oversubscription ratio are volatile with a higher standard
deviation of 49.08 and 31.77, respectively. This is because some IPOs have negative initial return
and oversubscription ratio.
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Table 2: Correlation between the explanatory variables
IR
OSR
Age
OP
Size
Variables
IR
1.00
OSR
0.22
1.00
Age
0.07
0.29
1.00
OP
0.10 -0.06
0.10
1.00
Size
-0.06 -0.08
0.09
-0.05
1.00
HR
0.61
0.33
0.05
-0.02
0.01

HR

1.00

Table 3: Regression. Dependent variable: Flipping Activity
Independent Variable
coefficient
t statistics
Constant
116.79
5.19***
0.01
0.35
IR
0.16
3.15***
OSR
4.00
1.36
LogAGE
-10.89
-0.95
LogOP
-11.05
-4.78***
LogSize
-0.06
-0.84
HR
Diagnostic test
Durbin-Watson
1.89
VIF
1.03-1.80
R-square
0.21
F-value
7.83
P-value
0.00
Note: *,** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively.

Table 2 presents the correlations analysis between the explanatory variables. Notably, the variables
such as IPO flipping activity, initial return, oversubscription ratio, firm age, offer period, firm size
and heuristic representation used in the analysis are not highly correlated. Therefore, there is no
multicollinearity in the model.
As observed in Table 3, the VIF is less than five, and Durbin Watson statistic is near to 2. The
oversubscription ratio has a positive and significant relationship with flipping activity. When the
demand increases by one time and the IPO flipping activity will increase by 0.16 per cent. This is
because higher demand makes investors flip more to liquidate the IPO on the first trading day. The
result is consistent with Sapian et al. (2012) and Abdul-Rahim et al. (2013).
Besides, the coefficient for firm size is -10.72 at 1 per cent level of significance. The result shows
that firm size has a negative relationship with flipping activity. When the firm size increases by
one time and the IPO flipping activity will decrease by 10.72 per cent. This is because the larger
scale of the IPO firm, it is more stable in terms of performance, and the risk from the business
operation is lower. This attracts substantial investors to hold the larger scale IPO rather than
dispose of it, hence lower flipping activity. The result is consistent with Chong et al. (2009), Chong
(2009) and Islam and Munira (2004). Overall, on average, the flipping activity is 98.96 per cent.
Therefore, H2 and H5 are supported.
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In Table 3, the variables of initial return, firm age and offer period are not significant statistically.
Initial return or quick return is not the aim of rational investors as shown by Islam and Munira
(2004), In addition, rational investors are more concern with firm performance as opposed to firm
age as concurred by Che-Yahya et al. (2004). Longer offer period enables the investors to study
the firm before deciding to subscribe the IPO. As the result, investors who are able to subscribe to
good IPO tend to hold it for long-term capital gain. Hence, H1, H3 and H4 are not supported.

Table 4: Results of the interaction effect of heuristic representation to the
flipping activity
Independent Variable
coefficient
t-statistics
Constant
98.01
3.80***
0.08
1.00
IR
0.34
3.81***
OSR
3.25
0.91
LogAGE
-2.37
-0.18
LogOP
-10.07
-3.85***
LogSize
0.09
0.12
HR
-0.0005
-0.59
IR* HR
-0.0029
-2.49***
OSR* HR
0.05
0.46
LogAGE* HR
-0.52
-1.15
LogOP* H.R.
0.04
0.52
LogSize* HR
Diagnostic test
Durbin-Watson
1.91
R-square
0.20
F-value
5.30
P-value
0.00
Note: *,** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively.

Table 4 shows the results of the interaction effect of heuristic representation. Oversubscription
ratio plays an important role to explain the flipping activity of the IPO. The higher oversubscription
ratio reflects higher investor demand for an IPO, a higher flipping activity that leads to higher
liquidation on the first trading day. Besides, the larger scale of firm size reflects the capital for an
IPO. Hence, a vast paid-up capital will lead to investors to hold on an IPO, and not keen to liquidate
on the first trading day.
The result shows that the oversubscription ratio and the firm size are the main factors to explain
the flipping activity. However, with the interaction effect of the heuristic representation with
oversubscription ratio, when the demand increases by one time and the IPO flipping activity will
decrease by 2.49 per cent. This contradicts the results in Table 3, because when the sentiment of
the investor has changed (heuristic representation), the IPO demand causes lower flipping activity.
It also means that investor is more pessimistic about trading when the sentiment of the investor is
weak and causes the investor has changed their trading behaviour (flipping activity).
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In the Malaysian financial market, the demand is essential to encourage investors or speculators to
subscribe to an IPO, especially on the first trading day. This resulted in the high trading activity of
the IPO. Potential buyers and sellers will trade actively and create higher liquidity to the secondary
market. However, the change of investor's sentiment plays an essential role to affect the IPO
demand, and the flipping activity will be affected. Therefore, H8 is supported, but H7, H9, H10
and H11 are not supported.
Table 5 shows a summary of hypotheses tested. Only IPO oversubscription ratio and firm size
influence the flipping activity. However, there is an interaction effect of heuristic representation
to the relationship between the oversubscription ratio and flipping activity.
Table 5: Hypotheses and Summary of Results
Hypotheses
H1
H2
H3
H4
H5
H6
H7
H8
H9
H10
H11

Factors
IR
OSR
Age
OP
Size
HR
IR x HR
OSR x HR
Age x HR
OP x HR
Size x HR

Predicted Sign
+
+
+
+
+
+
-

Hypotheses
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
-

Notes: The dependent variable is flipping activity. The factors consist of initial return (IR), oversubscription ratio
(OSR), firm age (Age), offer period (OP), firm size (Size) and heuristic representation (HR). +ve indicates an
expectation on the positive relationship while –ve indicates an expectation on the negative relationship. Hypotheses
supported by each variable is based on the value reported in table 3 and table 4.

Conclusion
In IPO issuance, it is believed that underwriter can gauge the sentiment of different investors, and
hence is more proficient in understanding demand and price setting of subsequent trading
activities. The success of an IPO depends on the condition of the financial market. However, based
on the results of this study, it is found that OSR is positive, firm size is negative, and the initial
return is not the primary concern in trading. Hence, it can be concluded that investors are keen to
participate in the new IPO issue regardless of the sentiment of investors. This result concurs with
Leow and Lau (2018a) as the sentiment of investor does not influence the OSR during the crisis
period.
Notably, this study finds: First, the distribution of initial return, oversubscription ratio, firm age,
offer period, firm size, heuristic representation, and flipping activity are positively skewed;
Secondly, oversubscription ratio has a positive relationship with flipping activity. This is because
higher demand makes investors flip more to liquidate the IPO on the first trading day. In contrast,
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firm size has a negative relationship with flipping activity. Larger IPO firm tends to show better
performance, and the risk from business operation tend to be lower. Thirdly, heuristic
representation influences the relationship between oversubscription ratio and flipping activity.
Lastly, this study dispels the notion that investors are active in subsequent trading but not
necessarily obtain profit from the liquidation. Besides, the empirical results are robust as both
results from the multiple regression and interaction effect yield a similar conclusion.
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